People’s judgments sometimes seem “intuitive”: they come to mind quickly, they are reached with little apparent effort, typically without conscious awareness of their origin or the manner of their formation, and they involve little or no conscious deliberation. In contrast, other judgments seem “deliberate”: they arise from tedious and complex thought processes that are assumed to be apparent and accessible to awareness (e.g., Evans, 2008; Kruglanski & Gigerenzer, in press). It has been stated that these two types of judgments have been treated differentially in the cognitive sciences, in that analytic philosophy, economics, and decision theory focused on deliberate, reflective judgments and decisions, whereas social psychology and psychoanalysis focused on intuitive, spontaneous behaviors (Kruglanski & Gigerenzer, in press). Consequently, psychologists have proposed that the mind is equally divided. Thus, in the last thirty years a number of models have been suggested that are based on the assumption "that judgments can be formed via two qualitatively distinct processes, or systems" (Kruglanski & Gigerenzer, in press). Read more...