Workshop: Materialism, Consciousness and Phenomenal Concept
Materialists hold that consciousness is physical and can be explained inphysical terms. In order to defend their position against dualist arguments,e.g. the charge that there remains an explanatory gap between physical eventsand subjective conscious experience, many materialists employ the so-calledphenomenal concept strategy. According to this position, the explanatory gapresults naturally from peculiar features of the special concepts we use torefer to our conscious experiences - phenomenal concepts like “pain”, “itch”,“red sensation” etc.
Central topics of this workshop are the credibility of this strategy, thequestion whether there are such concepts in contrast to physical concepts, thefate of materialism and its prospects for explaining consciousness.
- Derek Ball (University of St Andrews)
- Frank Hofmann (Universität Tübingen)
- Janet Levin (University of Southern California)
- Albert Newen (Ruhr-Universität Bochum)
- David Papineau (King's College London)
- Tobias Schlicht (Centre for Integrative Neuroscience Tübingen)
- Michael Tye (University of Texas Austin)
Organization: Dr. Tobias Schlicht, PD Dr. Frank Hofmann
Sponsored by the Centre for Integrative NeuroscienceParticipation is free but places are limited. If you are interested in participating, please write an e-mail.
- University of Tübingen
- Werner Reichardt Centre for Integrative Neuroscience